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AVIATION NEGOTIATIONS AND THE
U.S. MODEL AGREEMENT
RICHARD W. BOGOSIAN*
O UR INTERNATIONAL air transport system rests on an ex-
tensive and sometimes delicate fabric of bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements. In his paper presented to the Fourteenth An-
nual SMU Air Law Symposium a year ago' Dean Jeswald Salacuse
described in some detail how this system was developed during the
early years of the twentieth century and how the Chicago Con-
vention of 1944' was a climax to this process. As Dean Salacuse
observed, the Chicago Convention, which gave birth to the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the US-UK
Air Services Agreement of 1946,' better known as the Bermuda
agreement (and, since 1977, as Bermuda I), contained the princi-
pal conceptual elements that were the base of international avia-
tion law in the period following World War II.
Since the late 1970s, however, the Bermuda agreement has been
challenged by more liberal American policies embodied in the U.S.
model agreement. It remains a question whether the U.S. model
will replace the Bermuda agreement as the standard bilateral avia-
* A. B. Tufts University, 1959, J. D. University of Chicago, 1962, Chief Avia-
tion Negotiations Division, Office of Aviation, Department of State. Member
Massachusetts Bar.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily express the policy of
the Department of State.
I Salacuse, The Little Prince and the Businessman: Conflicts and Tensions in
Public International Air Law, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 807 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Salacuse].
' Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago, December 7,
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter cited as
Chicago Convention].
3 United States-United Kingdom Air Services Agreement, signed at Bermuda,
February 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507 [hereinafter cited as Bermu-
da 1].
1007
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tion agreement between nations. In order intelligently to consider
this question, it is necessary to review the steps leading from the
Bermuda agreement to the U.S. model and to look ahead to future
trends.
BACKGROUND
Aviation negotiations must have been pleasant for American
diplomats in the post-war period. United States political, economic
and military power were paramount and many were delighted with
the prospect of scheduled airline service connecting their countries
with the United States. Few foreign airlines could provide strong
competition to U.S. carriers, and in many places there was no local
airline at all. In short, the United States was in an expansive pos-
ture, and there were few, if any, impediments to such expansion in
the aviation area. Indeed, the United States was welcomed. In
many countries, bilateral aviation agreements were designed by
both sides to encourage service by U.S. airlines.
Even then, however, there was some concern over the prospect
of U.S. airlines overwhelming the other country's national carrier,
usually its only airline. The notion grew, and has become an in-
grained element of international aviation mythology, that there
was something so inherently strong, large and successful about U.S.
airlines that without protection no other country's carriers could
face the onslaught of unbridled competition from the Americans.
Dean Salacuse sketched these themes in his description of the
positions of the United States and the United Kingdom as they ne-
gotiated the original Bermuda agreement." As he notes, the agree-
ment was essentially a compromise.' The interesting thing about
that compromise was that it proved not only able to resolve Ameri-
can and British differences but equally sufficient in virtually all
other American agreements. This was true not only in the imme-
diate aftermath of World War II and the Chicago Convention but
also two decades later when the United States negotiated its first
bilateral a_-reements with many of the newly independent nations
of the world. Throughout the world among all types of govern-




ments, the basic Bermuda terms, or variations of them, became
standard.
What was the secret of the Bermuda formulation? Briefly, it was
broad language that appeared to offer considerable flexibility with-
in a rather controlled environment. Salient provisions of this type
of agreement are:
1. The right to designate an airline or airlines to operate over
the agreed route(s);
2. Broad language covering airline operating rights;
3. Dual approval (by the governments) of airline prices;
4. Consideration of airline capacity restricted to ex post facto
review; and
5. Rather precisely defined routes!
The agreements usually state that capacity should be related
closely to need, albeit in a flexible manner.' There is also lan-
guage to the effect that each party should have "a fair and equal
opportunity" to compete There was the assumption that fares
would be simple in structure and that actual fares would be ne-
gotiated directly by the airlines, presumably multilaterally under
the International Air Transport Association (IATA), a non-gov-
ernmental body.' Bermuda I type agreements generally have not
dealt with charters or all-cargo service because there were few such
operations when the agreements were first negotiated.
These agreements closely reflected the philosophies of the gov-
ernments that negotiated them, not the least the United States
government. Route descriptions which then, as now, varied with
each agreement tended to be generous in terms of intermediate and
beyond rights,"0 if for no other reason than that the technological
limitations of aircraft required such terms.
The agreements were general and represented compromises. In-
e Bermuda I, supra note 3.
See, e.g. Bermuda I, supra note 3.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 In other words, the designated airlines of one party were allowed to carry
traffic between points in the country of the other party and points in other coun-
tries. For example, the United States-Ecuador Agreement allows carriage of
traffic by designated U.S. carriers between Panama and Quito, Ecuador (which
would be an example of an intermediate right), and from Quito and Peru to Chile
(which would be an example of a beyond right).
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evitably, therefore, disputes arose. For example, capacity increases
were theoretically subject only to ex post facto review. However,
the idea that capacity should reflect demand, and the requirement
for fair and equal opportunity were often invoked as governments
challenged, a priori, proposed capacity increases. Most non-U.S.
Bermuda I agreements are implemented by pools and previously
defined capacity." U.S. carriers are not allowed to enter pool ar-
rangements under American anti-trust laws.
To this day the great majority of governments, which as a group
are remarkably conservative toward aviation issues whatever their
official ideology or political rhetoric on other matters, are comfort-
able with Bermuda I language and the concepts it embodies, al-
though by now there are several variations of the basic concepts.
Change was inevitable in a technically-advanced and competitive
industry such as aviation. During the 1960s jets became common-
place and in the 1970s wide-body aircraft accommodating hun-
dreds of passengers per flight became widely used on international
routes. Computerized reservation systems improved ticketing. At
the same time political and economic changes around the world
contributed to the explosion of air travel. By the mid-seventies
safe, comfortable and relatively inexpensive air travel was avail-
able to a vast market that included students, officials, workers and
middle class tourists travelling to all regions, and not simply to
wealthy people who crossed the Atlantic bound for European cap-
itals. From the vantage point of aviation, the world had changed
greatly since the days of Chicago and Bermuda.
At the same time changes of a different nature were also under-
way in the United States. By the late sixties and early seventies
there were several airlines serving international routes, and addi-
tional companies wished to enter this attractive and prestigious
part of the business. Even if U.S. carriers represent something less
than the catastrophic challenge feared by foreigners, one could not
deny that by the mid-seventies they were, as a group, large, ma-
ture and still aggressive. America's own regulatory approach to
aviation was being questioned. Increasingly, consumer complaints
n See, e.g. United Kingdom Air Services Agreements with Denmark (I.C.A.O.




and related issues required attention. Many commentators sug-
gested that the competitive dynamism of that industry should be
unleashed through deregulation."2
Thus, by the seventies, political, economic and technological
changes had altered the overall environment in which aviation
agreements were negotiated. More people wanted to travel to more
places by air, and in terms of the technological capability of air-
craft their wishes could be met. In the United States the airlines
wanted greater opportunities to fly to destinations outside of the
country. Deregulation was gaining favor as consumer interests re-
ceived greater attention.
Despite these many trends, the Bermuda formulation was still
the norm even for the United States well into the seventies. The
British, however, still had difficulty with the relative freedom and
flexibility allowed American carriers under the 1946 agreement.
For example, U.S. carriers had significant fifth freedom rightse"
under Bermuda I; they could fly to many destinations with United
Kingdom origin traffic. The British, never really comfortable with
American aviation liberalism, decided changes were necessary. To
them the issue was imbalance of economic benefits. Thus, the
United States bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom was
renegotiated. It was a tough negotiation; the United Kingdom even
denounced the existing agreement. To many this was unthinkable,
since Britain was America's most important overseas market. The
new US-UK Air Services Agreement of 1977"' (or Bermuda II)
was the result of the negotiation. Ironically, Bermuda II generally
"
2 See, e.g. R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATION (1962) (Harv. U.
Press); G. DOUGLAS AND J. MILLER ITT, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC
AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY (1974) (Brookings Institute); G. EADS,
THE LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINE EXPERIMENT (1972) (Brookings Institute); W.
FRUAEN, JR., THE FIGHT FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1972) (Harv. U.
Graduate Sch. Bus. Ad.); W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS
AND IMPERFECTIONS (1970) (Johns Hopkins Press); Keeler, Airline Regulations
and Market Performance, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT ScI. 399-424 (1972).
" For a discussion of the five "freedoms of the air," see Salacuse, supra note
1, at 822. The fifth freedom is the "freedom to pick up and discharge traffic at
intermediate points between the home country and the foreign country." Id.
14 United States-United Kingdom Air Services Agreement, sianed at Bermuda,
July 23, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 8641 [hereinafter cited as Bermuda Hi].
"5 See generally Comment, Bermuda If: The British Revolution of 1976, 44 J.
Am L. & COM. 111 (1978); Zan de Tunk, Some Observations on the Newly Born
Bermuda 11, 2 Am L. 190 (1977).
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proved to be the kiss of death to the Bermuda I formulation for the
United States government in the sense that, in the words of CAB
Chairman 'Cohen, "Bermuda II included terms that were so con-
trary to our fundamental competitive principles that many of our
airlines were astounded.""'
In sharp contrast to the broad rights ostensibly available under
a Bermuda I type agreement, Bermuda II attempts to nail down
virtually every facet of airline operations. Most significantly, it
offers protection to United Kingdom airlines against "excessive"
competition by price or by capacity offering." For North Atlantic
routes between the United States and the United Kingdom not only
are designations at individual gateways restricted to create mo-
nopoly or duopoly markets, but capacity offerings and prices are
subject to unilateral veto." For services to and via Hong Kong,
designations are not restricted, but U.S. gateway cities and services
on either side of Hong Kong (Japan and Thailand/Singapore) are
restricted to fourteen flights per week with traffic rights."
If anything, then, Bermuda II suggested that the United States
was moving toward more restrictive agreements, just as all trends
were pointing to the need for greater freedom and flexibility. With-
in three months after the signing of Bermuda II, the Aviation Sub-
committees of both the House and Senate held hearings on the
Agreements and the future direction of United States international
air transport policy. There was a sense of urgency because negotia-
tions with Japan then appeared imminent and there was great con-
cern that precise guidelines were needed to avoid a second Bermu-
da II with the Japanese-a result that was clearly unacceptable to
Congress."
At the Congressional hearings CAB Chairman Kahn suggested
that the United States should trade liberalizations for liberations,
rather than restrictions for restrictions, so that maximum benefits
for travellers and shippers-foreign or American-could be ob-
"Address by M. Cohen, "U.S. International Air Transportation Policy: Re-
flections and Objectives", International Aviation Club, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 16,
1981) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
1' Bermuda II, supra note 14.
1Id.
19 Id.
20 Cohen, supra note 16.
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tained. Kahn stressed the primacy of the consumer."' The policy
proposed by Chairman Kahn evolved into the public interest guide-
lines for the Carter Administration. The International Air Trans-
portation Competition Act of 1979' was a statement by Congress
on international aviation policy that complemented and extended
the Carter policy statement. Present United States policies, which
were set in motion by the Ford Administration, have had biparti-
san support in both the executive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment.
THE U.S. MODEL AGREEMENT
If there is one document that summarizes the basic terms .of the
United States government's international aviation policy, it is the
model bilateral agreement, the text of which appears in Appendix
1. It, by definition, represents the United States view of an "ideal"
agreement, and United States negotiators realize that it is rarely
possible to achieve an "ideal" agreement. Before reviewing the
record in obtaining liberal agreements that at least resemble the
model, let us consider its principal features.
The U.S. model agreement provides nearly total pricing free-
dom for airlines. Airlines of either Party and even third-flag air-
lines may set their prices free of government control unless both
governments agree intervention is warranted. Neither government
may control capacity, frequency or such operational matters as
change-of-gauge from a large aircraft to one or more smaller
planes. Charter operations may be conducted under the rules of
the airline's home country or the country of traffic origin. Route
rights typically are generous.
The U.S. model preamble contains several statements, stressing
competition among airlines, minimal government interference, ex-
pansion of opportunities and concern for the consumer, as well as
the usual remarks about safety and related matters. After Article
2- Hearings on the United States International Aviation Negotiations, Before
the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transpor-
tation, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 94 (1977).
22 "United States Policy for the Conduct of International Air Transportation
Negotiations", August 21, 1978.
2'International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L No.
96-192, 94 Stat. 35.
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1, which contains key definitions, and Article 2, which contains
the basic grants of rights, Article 3 establishes the right of multiple
designation. Instead of referring to "airline or airlines" as did Ber-
muda I, the model encompasses the "right to designate as many
airlines as (the Party) wishes . . . and to withdraw or alter such
designation." After several technical and safety articles, Article 8
grants substantial freedom of operations to airlines in the country
of the other Party. For example, the airlines are allowed to per-
form their own ground handling or, at their option, to select from
among competing agents for such services. In many countries the
national carrier or a closely allied national company has a mono-
poly in this area, and a government can indirectly limit the com-
mercial opportunities of foreign carriers through such monopoly
enterprises. Article 8 also makes explicit the rights of airlines to
sell transportation and remit profits without hindrance. Article 9,
which is similar to language in most Bermuda agreements, pro-
vides mutual tax exemption. Article 10 is meant to assure equit-
able treatment and minimal interference, even indirectly, with
commercial operations through the use of unfair user charges.
These "doing business" provisions are effectively summed up and
affirmed in the first two paragraphs of Article 11 which state
simply that airlines of both Parties should be given fair and equal
opportunity to compete and that unfair competitive practices and
discriminations should be removed. However, Article 11 goes on
to require complete operational freedom, subject to customs or
other technical constraints by saying that: "Neither Party shall
unilaterally limit the volume of traffic, frequency or regularity of
service or the aircraft type or types operated by the designated air-
lines." Nor shall either Party impose first refusal requirements,"
uplift ratios,' no-objection fees," or any other requirement re-
garding capacity, frequency, or traffic which "would be inconsis-
tent with the purposes of this Agreement."
24 A "first refusal agreement" is a rule that requires that the national airline
be given the first opportunity to have a particular business, before a foreign car-
rier is allowed to have it.
"An "uplift ratio" is used to define the traffic of one airline in terms of the
traffic of another airline.
2 "No-objection fees" refers to a fixed fee or commission that is paid to the
national airline (or the party to the agreement) before a foreign carrier can con-
duct its operation. This arrangement is most often seen in charter situations.
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The other central element of the model agreement is the pricing
article, Article 12. Whereas most bilateral agreements allow uni-
lateral disapproval, the United States model calls for "mutual disap-
proval" pricing. That is, prices set by the carriers shall be deemed
to be approved by both parties unless both formally disapprove the
fare. Prices are to be based upon commercial considerations in the
marketplace. Intervention is limited to prevention of predatory or
discriminatory prices or practices, protection of consumers from
unduly high prices or prices that reflect the abuse of market posi-
tion by a dominant carrier, and protection of airlines from prices
that are artificially low because of direct or indirect governmental
subsidy or support. The pricing article also allows third country
carriers to be price leaders. 7 For example, El Al or another third
country carrier could be a price leader on the Amsterdam-New
York route if a model-type agreement existed between the United
States and the Netherlands. As an additional aspect of de-control,
airlines of either Party can meet prices set by others.
As noted earlier the model agreement has an annex that allows
charter services to function with minimal restrictions. A charter
operator can use country of traffic origin or country of destination
rules, whichever it prefers. Since United States charter rules are
very liberal, this allows charter carriers, even those of the other
Party, great freedom to operate charter flights under the agreement.
Thus, by allowing multiple designations, capacity freedom, dual
disapproval pricing, charter operations under the rules of the
home country or the country of traffic origin and by stating its ob-
jectives in the preamble, the United States model bilateral aviation
agreement is aimed at allowing maximum freedom for airlines to
market and operate internationally. Commercial considerations in
the market-place will determine how airlines actually operate,
which carriers choose to enter, remain in or leave a market, what
pricing strategy they adopt and how well they compete with the
other carriers. The market and airline managements, rather than
governments, will be the principal arbiters of who comes and goes
and how individual companies perform. Theoretically, the airlines
will prosper once relieved of the heavy hand of government regula-
27 A "price leader" is an airline that sets new prices independently of the two
parties to the agreement.
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tion and the consumer will benefit. The model is the international
analogue to domestic deregulation.
The heady excitement that accompanied airline deregulation in
the United States was evident among those who first formulated
the policies that were reflected in the model agreement. They set
out to share their enthusiasm with aviation partners around the
world. Despite some initial successes, they were greeted with frosty
incredulity by the international aviation establishment. 8 One offi-
cial has succinctly summarized the international environment the
United States crusaders discovered as they met with foreign col-
leagues at meetings or in negotiations:
Internationally, it doesn't work quite that simply. There is no
broad international agreement as to the rules of the marketplace.
There are the American rules, the antitrust laws, and then there are
the rules of other countries or organizations. These other rules
range from no rules at all to those such as Australia's maritime
regulation of the outbound but not inbound trades, from rigidly
controlled markets in the planned economy countries to the emer-
gence of antitrust thinking in the European Community. Nobody,
however, has rules like ours. Many other nations don't understand
our rules very well. Those of us who have worked with the anti-
trust laws sympathize with this difficulty. Most of those foreigners
who understand our rules don't like them. They believe in market
structure, stability and harmony. That's a wonderful word by the
way. Harmony . . . the placid market. The placid market is
achieved by market division and pricing by agreement-ways of
life abroad. Price competition threatens stability and the health of
the enterprise. Without our experience in the large, unfettered do-
mestic market with its multiple participants, our colleagues abroad
shake their heads at our commitment to competition. They believe
either that we are a little bit crazy or, more likely, that we are try-
ing to open up international markets so that big American com-
panies can exploit them. Whatever their view of our motives, there
is no international agreement that competition is desirable, let
alone a body of rules promoting it.
Moreover, we control only our end of the international market.
We can deregulate ourselves but not our partners. We can, but it
isn't very sensible. Unilateral deregulation exposes us naked to the
elements. We can therefore deregulate internationally only by




agreement, and only by agreement which articulates the rules of
the marketplace. 9
Although many aviation leaders were critical, none was as ar-
ticulate or as persistent in his criticism as Knut Hammarskjold, Di-
rector General of IATA. He stressed the public utilities aspect of
airlines in his speeches, and reasoned that stability and depend-
ability required some level of regulation. In a speech in New York
given April 1980,' Hammarskjold warned of worsening economic
factors (e.g., unit cost increases overtaking yield improvements,
lower load factors) and predicted sharp cut-backs in service and
financial problems for airlines. Earlier Hammarskjold emphasized
international interdependence, gradualism, airline cooperation and
competition as elements to be judiciously weighed and carefully
mixed in meeting the new forces in international aviation. 1 He
criticized the United States for what was seen by many observers
outside that country to be excessive unilateralism and lack of con-
sideration for its aviation partners' views.
OUTLOOK: A NEW SYNTHESIS
As 1981 began United States aviation policy remained contro-
versial, not only with foreigners, but with many Americans as
well.' By then, however, there was at least somebody of exper-
ience to evaluate, and it was possible to attempt objective analysis
of the results of United States negotiating policy.
Clearly, there is not yet a complete change from Bermuda I
type agreements to the new United States model. Nevertheless, a
substantial number of liberal agreements were signed in the past
"Address by B. Boyd Hight, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation
and Telecommunications, Department of State, "Deregulation Abroad: A Game
Without Rules", International Aviation Club, Washington, D.C. (November 18,
1980).
3 Address by Knut Hammarskjold, Director General, International Air Trans-
port Association, Lloyd's of London Press International Civil Aviation Confer-
ence, New York (April 29, 1980).
31 Address by Knut Hammarskjold, "Trends in International Aviation Since
World War II and Governmental Policies with Respect to Routes, Fares, Chart-
ers, Capacity and Designation", Symposium on International Aviation Policy,
Kingston, Jamaica (January 31, 1979).
12 Is the U.S. Sabotaging Its International Airlines? Bus. WEEK, Jan. 26, 1981,
at 77.
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three years. Agreements with Belgium,"' Finland,' the Nether-
lands,' Germany," Israel," Jordan, 8 Singapore,"' Thailand,"0 Costa
Rica, 1 the Netherlands Antilles,' and Jamaicae' are either similar
to the model or are notably more liberal than the Bermuda I form-
ulation. Several other governments have indicated a willingness to
negotiate liberal agreements. Moreover, recent changes in United
States agreements with the United Kingdom," the Philippines, '
Australia, ' New Zealand," and Brazil" introduce significant new
Agreement on Air Transport Services, December 12-14, 1978, United States-
Belgium, 30 U.S.T. 617, T.I.A.S. No. 9207.
'Agreement on Air Transport Services, May 12, 1980, United States-Finland,
U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. (an ad referendum agree-
ment currently awaiting ratification).
'Protocol Relating to Air Transport Services, March 31, 1978, United States-
Netherlands, 29 U.S.T. 3088, T.I.A.S. No. 8998.
' Protocol Relating to Air Transport Services, November 1, 1978, United
States-Federal Republic of Germany, U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No.
9591.
1 Protocol Relating to Air Transport Services, August 16, 1978, United
States-Israel, 29 U.S.T. 3144, T.I.A.S. No. 9002.
' Agreement on Air Transport Services, March 5-April, 1980, United States-
Jordan, U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 9777.
11 Agreement on Air Transport Services, September 14, 1979, United States-
Singapore, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 9654.
40 Agreement on Air Transport Services, December 7, 1979, United States-
Thailand, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 9704.
41 Understanding on Air Transport Services, August 17, 1979, United States-
Costa Rica, _ _ U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. (an ad referen-
dum agreement currently awaiting ratification by Costa Rica).
' Understanding on Air Transport Services, January 22, 1980, United States-
Netherland Antilles, U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. - (an ad
referendum agreement currently awaiting ratification by Netherland Antilles).
I Protocol Relating to Air Transport Services, April 4, 1979, United States-
Jamaica, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 9613.
"Agreement on Air Transport Services, March 5, 1980, United States-
United Kingdom, -___ U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. (an ad
referendum agreement currently awaiting ratification).
45 Agreement on Air Transport Services, November 5, 1980, United States-
Philippines, U.S.T. __ , T.I.A.S. No. (an ad referen-
dum agreement currently awaiting ratification).
"Agreement on Air Transport Services, May 23, 1980, United States-Aus-
tralia, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. -_ (an ad referendum
agreement currently awaiting ratification).
4 Agreement on Air Transport Services, April 25, 1980, United States-New
Zealand, U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. - (an ad referendum
agreement currently awaiting ratification).
4'Agreement on Air Transport Services, October 30, 1980, United States-
U.S. MODEL AGREEMENT
liberal features. For example, each agreement either has a liberal
pricing article or in practice encourages some degree of innovative
pricing.
To be sure, several important countries, especially in Europe
and South America, remain apparently impervious to change. This
list, however, includes some of the largest United States markets,
and it is interesting to note that liberal agreements have been
reached in each of the major areas of the world. Moreover, as ex-
perience is gained, it is apparent that several countries are more
interested than they were a year or so ago in at least considering
the liberalization of existing agreements.
Despite the criticism of many and the obvious fact that the
liberal American model remains unorthodox, American policy has
achieved some noteworthy successes. Indeed, one must first put
to one side the more extreme statements made by ideologues on
either side and consider what, in fact, is happening. In brief, the
United States has embarked on a major effort to liberalize the in-
ternational aviation legal framework as embodied by its many bi-
lateral aviation agreements. Its objectives have been publicly stated
often and are affirmed in recent legislation. Other governments
have been reacting to the United States initiative; in this sense the
United States continues to be the most dynamic and innovative
locus of thinking with respect to aviation agreements. The legiti-
mate concerns of its aviation partners-special marketing consid-
erations, particularly in thin, undeveloped markets, and serious
commercial problems, notably the rapid, steep rise in the price of
fuel which has affected the economics of certain aircraft-are fac-
tors which cannot be, and in practice are not, ignored.
It is simplistic, therefore, to argue that the United States is
forcing its model language on other countries. In recent negotia-
tions, while striving for more liberal agreements ultimately, the
United States has discussed limited market protection, phasing of
changes in pricing and other ideas that will allow each side to
adjust to change. For example, with Australia in 1978 and Brazil
in 1980 the United States agreed to temporary, experimental lib-
eral pricing arrangements. The new United States-Philippine agree-
Brazil, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. (an ad referendum
agreement currently awaiting ratification).
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ment which was signed in 1980 is also a step forward for the
American pro-competitive philosophy. The pricing provisions of
the agreement give airlines considerable flexibility to explore the
supply-demand function, while both governments retain power to
curb overly-adventurous excursions from the norm. Designations
of a total of six airlines are phased in; capacity, while limited for
an interim period, is then unrestricted. 9 With countries such as
Costa Rica"0 and the Netherlands Antilles,"' where the national
carrier is relatively small and critically dependent on traditional
traffic flows, the United States has agreed to temporary protection
in key markets. The United States has explained that foreign tour-
ist markets could develop better if United States airlines could
have greater flexibility. The United States government has been
generous in granting new routes to this country. As Chairman
Cohen pointed out the debate has shifted, at least in Europe, to
how to liberalize and not whether to liberalize. For example, the
Commission of the European Economic Community is pressing
for intra-European service experiments which resemble the current
United States market, and such traditionalists as British Airways
and Air France are beginning to tailor their offerings to precise
market segments.
Looking to the future, three elements are likely to characterize
the continuing pursuit of the United States' objectives. First, top
priority will be attached to major United States markets. Secondly,
the government will insure that the rights obtained in recent nego-
tiations will actually be available. If, for example, a lucrative route
is exchanged for the right of United States carriers to self-handle
or remit earnings without hindrance, the United States will firmly
insist on actually receiving the benefits obtained if the other party
hopes to exercise or keep its new route right. Finally, however,
41 Agreement on Air Transport Services, November 3, 1980, United States-
Philippines, U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. - (an ad referen-
dum agreement currently awaiting ratification).
50 Understanding on Air Transport Services, August 17, 1979, United States-
Costa Rica, U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. - (an ad referendum
agreement currently awaiting ratification by Costa Rica).
51 Agreement on Air Transport Services, January 25, 1980, United States-
Netherland Antilles, U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. (an
ad referendum agreement currently awaiting ratification by Netherland Antilles).
5 Cohen, supra note 16.
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there will be what one official described as "creative pragmatism"
on the United States side.53 Unique or special circumstances will
not be ignored and the United States will be prepared, as noted
above, to consider temporary or alternative variations that will
provide the assurances the other side needs, while allowing the
greater openness the United States government considers important.
The model agreement is not yet the international standard. A pro-
cess of change, however, is definitely under way. It will continue.
As more bilateral agreements are negotiated and the international
community is able more objectively to analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of liberal agreements, as they gain experience with the
agreements and as they are better able to refine the terms of such
agreements, it would not be surprising if a new synthesis emerges
and a new formulation replaces Bermuda I as the international
standard. Ultimately, it is not unreasonable to suppose that a freer
system, more sensitive to consumer interests, while also adequate
to meet the legitimate requirements of airlines and governments,
will emerge. This will take time, and by then the sound and fury
of the late seventies may be forgotten. The legal framework which
emerges, however, will be more appropriate to the late twentieth




BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF
The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of
Desiring to promote an international air transport system based
Hight, supra note 29.
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on competition among airlines in the marketplace with minimum
governmental interference and regulation;
Desiring to facilitate the expansion of international air trans-
port opportunities;
Desiring to make it possible for airlines to offer the traveling
and shipping public a variety of service options at the lowest prices
that are not predatory or discriminatory and do not represent abuse
of a dominant position and wishing to encourage individual air-
lines to develop and implement innovative and competitive prices;
Desiring to ensure the highest degree of safety and security in
international air transport and reaffirming their grave concern
about acts or threats against the security of aircraft, which jeopar-
dize the safety of persons or property, adversely affected the opera-
tion of air transportation, and undermine public confidence in the
safety of civil aviation;
Being Parties to the Convention of International Civil Aviation
opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944;
Desiring to conclude a new agreement covering all forms of
air transportation to replace the Air Transport Agreement con-
cluded between them and signed at on
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
Definitions
For the purposes of this Agreement, unless otherwise stated,
the term:
(a) "Aeronautical authorities" means, in the case of the United
States, the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Department of Trans-
portation, whichever has jurisdiction, or their successor agencies,
and in the case of
, or its successor agency;
(b) "Agreement" means this Agreement, its Annexes, and any
amendments thereto;
(c) "Air transportation" means any operation performed by
aircraft for the public carriage of traffic in passengers, baggage,




(d) "Convention" means the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944,
and includes:
(i) any amendment which has entered into force under
Article 94(a) of the Convention and has been ratified
by both parties, and
(ii) any Annex or any amendment thereto adopted under
Article 90 of the Convention, insofar as such Annex
or amendment is at any given time effective for both
parties;
(e) "Designated airline" means an airline designated and au-
thorized in accordance with Article 3 of this Agreement;
(f) "Price" means:
(i) any fare, rate or price to be charged by airlines, or
their agents, and the conditions governing the avail-
ability of such fare, rate and price;
(ii) the charges and conditions for services ancillary to
carriage of traffic which are offered by airlines; and
(iii) amounts charged by airlines to air transportation/
intermediaries;
for the carriage of passengers (and their baggage) and/or cargo
(excluding mail) in air transportation.
(g) "International air transportation" means an air transporta-
tion which passes through the air space over the territory of more
than one State;
(h) "Stop for non-traffic purposes" means a landing for any
purpose other than taking on or discharging passengers, baggage,
cargo and mail in air transportation;
(i) "Territory" means the land areas under the sovereignty,
jurisdiction, protection, or trusteeship of a Party, and the terri-
torial waters adjacent thereto;
(j) "User charge" means a charge made to airlines for the pro-
vision of airport, air navigation or aviation security property or
facilities; and
(k) "Full economic costs" means the direct cost of providing
service plus a reasonable charge for administrative overhead.
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ARTICLE 2
Grant of Rights
(1) Each Party grants to the other Party the following rights
for the conduct of international air transportation by the airlines
of the other Party:
(a) the right to fly across its territory without landing;
(b) the right to make stops in its territory for non-traffic
purposes;
(c) the rights otherwise specified in this Agreement.
(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) of this article shall be deemed
to grant the right for one Party's airlines to participate in air trans-
portation between points in the territory of the other Party.
ARTICLE 3
Designation and Authorization
(1) Each Party shall have the right to designate as many air-
lines as it wishes to conduct international air transportation in ac-
cordance with this Agreement and to withdraw or alter such desig-
nations. Such designations shall be transmitted to the other Party
in writing through diplomatic channels, and shall identify whether
the airline is authorized to conduct the type of air transportation
specified in Annex I or in Annex II or in both.
(2) On receipt of such a designation and of applications in
the form and manner prescribed from the designated airline for
operating authorizations and technical permissions, the other
Party shall grant appropriate authorizations and permissions with
minimum procedural delay, provided:
(a) substantial ownership and effective control of that
airline are vested in the Party designating the airline,
nationals of that Party, or both;
(b) the designated airline is qualified to meet the condi-
tions prescribed under the laws and regulations norm-
ally applied to the operation of international air trans-
portation by the Party considering the application or
applications; and
(c) the Party designating the airline is maintaining and






(1) Each Party may revoke, suspend or limit the operating au-
thorizations or technical permissions of an airline designated by
the other Party where:
(a) substantial ownership and effective control of that air-
line are not vested in the other Party or the other
Party's nationals;
(b) that airline has failed to comply with the laws and
regulations referred to in Article 5 of this Agreement;
or
(c) the other Party is not maintaining and administering
the standards as set forth in Article 6 (Safety).
(2) Unless immediate action is essential to prevent further non-
compliance with subparagraphs (1) (b) or (1) (c) of this Article,
the rights established by this article shall be exercised only after
consultation with the other Party.
ARTICLE 5
Application of Laws
(1) While entering, within or leaving the territory of one Party,
its laws and regulations relating to the operation and navigation of
aircraft shall be complied with by the other Party's airlines.
(2) While entering, within or leaving the territory of one Party,
its laws and regulations relating to the admission to or departure
from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo on aircraft (includ-
ing regulations relating to entry, clearance, aviation security, im-
migration, passports, customs and quarantine or, in the case of
mail, postal regulations) shall be complied with by or on behalf of
such passengers, crew or cargo of the other Party's airlines.
ARTICLE 6
Safety
(1) Each Party shall recognize as valid, for the purpose of
operating the air transportation provided for in this Agreement,
certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency, and li-
censes issued/or validated by the other Party and still in force,
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provided that the requirements for such certificates or licenses at
least equal the minimum standards which may be established pur-
suant to the Convention. Each Party may, however, refuse to rec-
ognize as valid for the purpose of flight above its own territory,
certificates of competency and licenses granted to or validated for
its own nationals by the other Party.
(2) Each Party may request consultations concerning the safe-
ty and security standards maintained by the other Party relating to
aeronautical facilities, aircrew, aircraft, and operation of the des-
ignated airlines. If, following such consultations, one Party finds
that the other Party does not effectively maintain and administer
safety and security standards and requirements in these areas that
at least equal the minimum standards which may be established
pursuant to the Convention, the other Party shall be notified of
such findings and the steps considered necessary to conform with
these minimum standards; and the other Party shall take appro-
priate corrective action. Each Party reserves the right to withhold,
revoke or limit the operating authorization or technical permission
of an airline or airlines designated by the other Party in the event





(1) reaffirms its commitment to act consistently with the pro-
visions of the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on September 14,
1963, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, signed at The Hague on December 16, 1970, and the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on September 23,
1971;
(2) shall require that operators of aircraft of its registry act
consistently with applicable aviation security provisions established
by the International Civil Aviation Organization; and
(3) shall provide maximum aid to the other Party with a view
to preventing unlawful seizure of aircraft, sabotage to aircraft, air-
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ports, and air navigation facilities, and threats to aviation security;
give sympathetic consideration to any request from the other Party
for special security measures for its aircraft or passengers to meet
a particular threat; and, when incidents or threats of hijacking or
sabotage against aircraft, airports or air navigation facilities occur,
assist the other Party by facilitating communications intended to
terminate such incidents rapidly and safely.
ARTICLE 8
Commercial Opportunities
(1) The airlines of one Party may establish offices in the ter-
ritory of the other Party for the promotion and sale of air trans-
portation.
(2) The designated airlines of one Party may, in accordance
with the laws and regulations of the other Party relating to entry,
residence and employment, bring in and maintain in the territory
of the other Party managerial, sales, technical, operational and
other specialist staff required for the provision of air transporta-
tion.
(3) Each designated airline may perform its own ground han-
dling in the territory of the other Party ("self-handling") or, at
its option, select among competing agents for such services. These
rights shall be subject only to physical constraints resulting from
considerations of airport safety. Where such considerations pre-
clude self-handling, ground services shall be available on an equal
basis to all airlines; charges shall be based on the costs of services
provided; and such services shall be comparable to the kind and
quality of services if self-handling were possible.
(4) Each airline of one Party may engage in the sale of air
transportation in the territory of the other Party directly and, at
the airline's discretion, through its agents, except as may be spe-
cifically provided by the charter regulations of the country in which
the charter originates. Each airline may sell such transportation,
and any person shall be free to purchase such transportation, in
the currency of that territory or in freely convertible currencies.
(5) Each airline of one Party may convert and remit to its
country, on demand, local revenues in excess of sums locally dis-
bursed. Conversion and remittance shall be permitted promptly
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without restrictions or taxation in respect thereof at the rate of ex-
change applicable to current transactions and remittance.
ARTICLE 9
Customs Duties and Taxes
(1) On arriving in the territory of one Party, aircraft operated
iinternational air transportation by the designated airlines of the
other Party, their regular equipment, ground equipment, fuel, lu-
bricants, consumable technical supplies, spare parts including en-
gines, aircraft stores (including but not limited to such items as
food, beverages and liquor, tobacco and other products destined
for sale to or use by passengers in limited quantities during the
flight), and other items intended for or used solely in connection
with the operation or servicing of aircraft engaged in international
air transportation shall be exempt, on the basis of reciprocity, from
all import restrictions, property taxes and capital levies, customs
duties, excise taxes, and similar fees and charges imposed by the
national authorities, and not based on the cost of services pro-
vided, provided such equipment and supplies remain on board the
aircraft.
(2) There shall also be exempt, on the basis of reciprocity,
from the taxes, duties, fees and charges referred to in paragraph
(1) of this Article, with the exception of charges based on the
cost of the service provided:
(a) aircraft stores introduced into or supplied in the ter-
ritory of a Party and taken on board, within reasonable limits, for
use on outbound aircraft of a designated airline of the other Party
engaged in international air transportation, even when these stores
are to be used on a part of the journey performed over the territory
of the Party in which they are taken on board;
(b) ground equipment and spare parts including engines
introduced into the territory of a Party for the servicing, mainten-
ance or repair of aircraft of a designated airline of the other Party
used in international air transportation; and
(c) fuel, lubricants and consumable technical supplies in-
troduced into or supplied in the territory of a Party for use in an
aircraft of a designated airline of the other Party engaged in inter-
national air transportation, even when these supplies are to be used
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on a part of the journey performed over the territory of the Party
in which they are taken on board.
(3) Equipment and supplies referred to in paragraphs (1) and
(2) of this Article may be required to be kept under the super-
vision or control of the appropriate authorities.
(4) The exemptions provided for by this Article shall also-be
available where ..the. designated .airlines of one Party have ,cQ*-
tracted with another airline, which similarly enjoys such exemp-
tions from the other Party, for the loan or transfer in tli4terr1try
of the other Party of the items specified in paragraphs (1) and (2)
of this Article.
(5) Each Party shall use its best efforts to secure for the desig-
nated airlines of the other Party, on the basis of reciprocity, an
exemption from taxes, duties, charges and fees imposed by State,
regional and local authorities on the items specified in paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this Article, as well as from fuel through-put
charges, in the circumstances described in this Article, except to




(1) User charges imposed by the competent charging authori-
ties on the airlines of the other Party shall be just, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory.
(2) User charges imposed on the airlines of the other Party
may reflect, but shall not exceed, an equitable portion of the full
economic cost to the competent charging authorities of providing
the airport, air navigation, and aviation security facilities and ser-
vices. Facilities and services for which charges are made shall be
provided on an efficient and economic basis. Reasonable notice
shall be given prior to changes in user charges. Each Party shall
encourage consultations between the competent charging authori-
ties in its territory and airlines using the services and facilities, and
shall encourage the competent charging authorities and the air-
lines to exchange such information as may be necessary to permit
an accurate review of the reasonableness of the charges.
1981] 1029
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ARTICLE 11
Fair Competition
(1) Each Party shall allow a fair and equal opportunity for
the designated airlines of both Parties to compete in the interna-
tional air transportation covered by this Agreement.
(2) Each Party shall take all appropriate action within its jur-
isdiction to eliminate all forms of discrimination or unfair com-
petition practices adversely affecting the competitive position of
the airlines of the other Party.
(3) Neither Party shall unilaterally limit the volume of traffic,
frequency or regularity of service, or the aircraft type or types
operated by the designated airlines of the other Party, except as
may be required for customs, technical, operational or environ-
mental reasons under uniform conditions consistent with Article
15 of the Convention.
(4) Neither Party shall impose on the other Party's designated
airlines a first refusal requirement, uplift ratio, no-objection fee,
or any other requirement with respect to the capacity, frequency
or traffic which would be inconsistent with the purposes of this
Agreement.
(5) Neither Party shall require the filing of schedules, pro-
grams for charter flights, or operational plans by airlines of the
other Party for approval, except as may be required on a non-dis-
criminatory basis to enforce uniform conditions as foreseen by
paragraph (3) of this Article or as may be specifically authorized
in an Annex to this Agreement. If a Party requires filings for in-
formation purposes, it shall minimize the administrative burdens
of filing requirements and procedures on air transportation inter-
mediaries and on designated airlines of the other Party.
ARTICLE 12
Pricing (Mutual Disapproval)
(1) Each Party shall allow prices for air transportation to be
established by each designated airline based upon commercial con-
siderations in the marketplace. Intervention by the Parties shall be
limited to:




(b) protection of consumers from prices that are unduly
high or restrictive because of the abuse of a dominant position; and
(c) protection of airlines from prices that are artificially
low because of direct or indirect governmental subsidy or support.
(2) Each Party may require notification to or filing with its
aeronautical authorities of prices proposed to be charged to or
from its territory by airlines of the other Party. Notification or
filing by the airlines of both Parties may be required no more than
60 days before the proposed date of effectiveness. In individual
cases, notification or filing may be permitted on shorter notice
than normally required. Neither Party shall require the notifica-
tion or filing by airlines of the other Party or by airlines of third
countries of prices charged by charterers to the public for traffic
originating in the territory of the other Party.
(3) Neither Party shall take unilateral action to prevent the
inauguration or continuation of a price proposed to be charged or
charged by (a) an airline of either Party or by an airline of a third
country for international air transportation between the territories
of the Parties, or (b) an airline of one Party or an airline of a
third country for international air transportation between the ter-
ritory of the other Party and any other country, including in both
cases transportation on an interline or intra-line basis. If either
Party believes that any such price is inconsistent with the consid-
erations set forth in paragraph (a) of this Article, it shall request
consultations and notify the other Party of the reasons for its dis-
satisfaction as soon as possible. These consultations shall be held
not later than 30 days after receipt of the request, and the Parties
shall cooperate in securing information necessary for reasoned
resolution of the issue. If the Parties reach agreement with respect
to a price for which a notice of dissatisfaction has been given, each
Party shall use its best efforts to put that agreement into effect.
Without mutual agreement, that price shall go into or continue in
effect.
(4) Notwithstanding paragraph (3) of this Article, each Party
shall allow (a) any airline of either Party or any airline of a third
country to meet a lower or more competitive price proposed or
charged by any other airline or charterer for international air
transportation between the territories of the Parties, and (b) any
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airline of one Party to meet a lower or more competitive price pro-
posed or charged by any other airline or charterer for international
air transportation between the territory of the other Party and a
third country. As used herein, the term "meet" means the right to
establish on a timely basis, using such expedited procedures as may
be necessary, an identical or similar price on a direct, interline or
intra-line basis, notwithstanding differences in conditions relating
to routing, roundtrip requirements, connections, type of service or
aircraft type, or such price through a combination of prices.
ARTICLE 13
Consultations
Either Party may. at any time, request consultations relating to
this Agreement. Such consultations shall begin at the earliest pos-
sible date, but not later than 60 days from the date the other Party
receives the request unless otherwise agreed. Each Party shall pre-
pare and present during such consultations relevant evidence in




(1) Any dispute arising under this Agreement which is not re-
solved by a first round of formal consultations, except those which
may arise under paragraph 3 of Article 12 (Pricing), may be re-
ferred by agreement of the Parties for decision to some person or
body. If the Parties do not so agree, the dispute shall at the re-
quest of either Party be submitted to arbitration in accordance
with the procedures set forth below.
(2) Arbitration shall be by a tribunal of three arbitrators to be
constituted as follows:
(a) within 30 days after the receipt of a request for arbi-
tration, each Party shall name one arbitrator. Within 60 days after
these two arbitrators have been named, they shall by agreement
appoint a third arbitrator, who shall act as President of the arbitral
tribunal;
(b) if either Party fails to name an arbitrator, or if the
1032
U.S. MODEL AGREEMENT
third arbitrator is not appointed in accordance with subparagraph
(a) of this paragraph, either Party may request the President of
the International Court of Justice to appoint the necessary arbi-
trator or arbitrators within 30 days. If the President is of the same
nationality as one of the Parties, the most senior Vice President
who is not disqualified on that ground shall make the appointment.
(3) Except as otherwise agreed, the arbitral tribunal shall de-
termine the limits of its jurisdiction in accordance with this Agree-
ment and shall establish its own procedure. At the direction of the
tribunal or at the request of either of the Parties, a conference to
determine the precise issues to be arbitrated and the specific pro-
cedures to be followed shall be held no later than 15 days after
the tribunal is fully constituted.
(4) Except as otherwise agreed, each Party shall submit a
memorandum within 45 days of the time the tribunal is fully con-
stituted. Replies shall be due 60 days later. The tribunal shall hold
a hearing at the request of either Party or at its discretion within
15 days after replies are due.
(5) The tribunal shall attempt to render a written decision
within 30 days after completion of the hearing or, if no hearing
is held, after the date both replies are submitted, whichever is
sooner. The decision of the majority of the tribunal shall prevail.
(6) The Parties may submit requests for clarification of the
decision within 15 days after it is rendered and any clarification
given shall be issued within 15 days of such request.
(7) Each Party shall, consistent with its national law, give full
effect to any decision or award of the arbitral tribunal.
(8) The expenses of the arbitral tribunal, including the fees
and expenses of the arbitrators, shall be shared equally by the
Parties. Any expenses incurred by the President of the Internation-
al Court of Justice in connection with the procedures of paragraph
(2) (b) of this Article shall be considered to be part of the ex-
penses of the arbitral tribunal.
ARTICLE 15
Termination
Either Party may, at any given time give notice in writing to
the other Party of its decision to terminate this Agreement. Such
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notice shall be sent simultaneously to the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization. This Agreement shall terminate at midnight (at
the place of receipt of notice to the other Party) immediately be-
fore the first anniversary of the date of receipt of the notice by the
other Party, unless the notice is withdrawn by agreement before
the end of this period.
ARTICLE 16
Multilateral Agreement
If a multilateral agreement, accepted by both Parties, concern-
ing any matter covered by this Agreement enters into force, this
Agreement shall be amended so as to conform with the provisions
of the multilateral agreement.
ARTICLE 17
Registration with ICAO
This agreement and all amendments thereto shall be registered
with the International Civil Aviation Organization.
ARTICLE 18
Entry into Force






Airlines of one Party whose designation identifies this Annex
shall, in accordance with the terms of their designation, be entitled
to perform international air transportation (1) between points on
the following routes, and (2) between points on such routes and
points in third countries through points in the territory of the
Party which has designated the airline.
A. Routes for the airline or airlines designated
by the Government of the United States:
B. Routes for the airline or airlines designated
by the Government of
Section 2
Each designated airline may, on any or all flights and at its op-
tion, operate flights in either or both directions and without direc-
tional or geographic limitation, serve points on the routes in any
order, and omit stops at any point or points outside the territory
of the Party which has designated that airline, without loss of any
right to carry traffic otherwise permissible under this Agreement.
Section 3
On any international segment or segments of the routes de-
scribed in Section 1 above, a designated airline may perform in-
ternational air transportation without any limitation as to change,
at any point on the route, in type or number of aircraft operated,
provided that: in the outbound direction the transportation beyond
such point is a continuation of the transportation from the territory
of the Party which has designated the airline and, in the inbound
direction, the transportation to the territory of the Party which has
designated the airline is a continuation of the transportation be-
yond such point.
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Airlines of one Party whose designation identifies this Annex
shall, in accordance with the terms of their designation, be entitled
to perform international air transportation to, from and through
any point or points in the territory of the other Party, either di-
rectly or with stopovers en route, for one-way or roundtrip car-
riage of the following traffic:
(a) any traffic to or from a point or points in the territory
of the Party which has designated the airline;
(b) any traffic to or from a point or points beyond the ter-
ritory of the Party which has designated the airline and carried be-
tween the territory of that Party and such beyond point or points
(i) in transportation other than under this Annex; or (ii) in trans-
portation under this Annex with the traffic making a stopover of
at least two consecutive nights in the territory of that Party.
Section 2
With regard to traffic originating in the territory of either Party,
each airline performing air transportation under this Annex shall
comply with such laws, regulations and rules of the Party in whose
territory the traffic originates, whether on a one-way or roundtrip
basis, as that Party now or hereafter specifies shall be applicable
to such transportation. When such regulations or rules of one Party
apply more restrictive terms, conditions or limitations to one or
more of its airlines, the designated airlines of the other Party shall
be subject to the least restrictive of such terms, conditions or limi-
tations. Moreover, if the aeronautical authorities of either Party
promulgate regulations or rules which apply different conditions to
different countries, each Party shall apply the least restrictive reg-
ulation or rule to the designated airlines of the other Party.
Section 3
Neither Party shall require a designated airline of the other
Party, in respect of the carriage of traffic from the territory of that
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other Party on a one-way or roundtrip basis, to submit more than
a declaration of conformity with the laws, regulations and rules of
that other Party referred to under Section 2 of this Annex or of a
waiver of these regulations or rules granted by the aeronautical au-
thorities of that other Party.
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